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JPRS L/8493

1 June 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE  
(FOUO 32/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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## TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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### CONTENTS

PAGE

#### EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

##### ITALY

- PCI's Pajetta: Reconciling Eurocommunism With EP Elections  
(Mario Carzonio; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 22 Apr 79) .... 1

#### COUNTRY SECTION

##### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Abuses of National Security Computer Files Examined  
(Peter Koch, Michael Seufert; STERN, 26 Apr 79) ..... 4

##### FRANCE

- Presidential Candidates Seen Running Already  
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 27 Apr 79) ..... 9

- Sequel to Montaldo Revelations Regarding BCEN Described  
(Claude Jacquemart; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 30 Apr 79) ... 15

##### Briefs

- New Inspector-General 19  
Military Appointment Noted 19  
Foreign Affairs Recruiting 19  
Dissidents Join Forces 19

##### ITALY

- Napolitano Kicks Off Communists' Election Campaign  
(CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 24 Apr 79) ..... 20

- DC Resolution: 'No Coalition Government With Communists'  
(Gaetano Scardocchia; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 30 Apr 79). 22

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

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CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

First All-Electronic Locomotive 'E-633' Tested  
(Mario Righetti; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 9 Apr 79) .... 26

SPAIN

ERRATUM: In JPRS L/8460 (FOUO 28/79) 15 May 1979, pp  
37-42, in article "SOCIAL DEMOCRATS DOMINATE NEW CABINET,"  
please substitute the following line for line 3, paragraph  
4, on page 41.

--as Alfonso Guerra calls him--who belonged to CUI, will  
have the difficult task of...

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

ITALY

PCI'S PAJETTA: RECONCILING EUROCOMMUNISM WITH EP ELECTIONS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Apr 79 p 16

[Article by Mario Carzonio]

[Text] Pajetta reveals PCI slate for European elections.  
Platform explained at Casa della Cultura.  
Polemics with Christian Democrats and Socialists.

What ever became of Eurocommunism? Rising to that provocation, the pepperiest and feistiest of the Communist leaders did not bat an eye as he replied: "It is not dead, it is alive and well. Besides, haven't you noticed that they are beginning to like it even in China?" One-liners apart, those of us who were asking serious questions as to the PCI's troubles on the issue of where it stood internationally on the eve of European unification (particularly after it sided with Moscow in its view of the Sino-Vietnam conflict) are getting a serious first answer from the Community campaign for the 10 June elections. Eurocommunism is not rusting junk ready for the scrapheap; as Berlinguer and his staff on Botteghe Oscure have been explaining for years, the point of departure for any socialist transformation is respect for the individuality of each country and each Communist Party. Pajetta spelled it out clearly yesterday when he joined Altiero Spinelli, Sergio Segre, Tullia Carrettoni, Silvio Leonardi, Renato Sandri, Aldo Bonaccini, and Angelo Carossino on the podium yesterday at the Casa della Cultura yesterday to unveil the PCI's program for the European elections.

If Eurocommunism is indeed not dead, then it is more than fair to wonder why the European Communists (with the Italians and French in the lead) are running on clearly separated platforms. Pajetta replied to that question: "We are going into the elections separately because we don't want to confuse the voters: there are differences between us and other Communist Parties, and there's no point in trying to hide them."

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Partly to be true to the campaign climate, the PCI spokesman moved quickly from sweet reasonableness to the barricades: "I cannot call them cheats, because I have promised to keep this a civil campaign; even so, others have chosen to pretend: they say they are united, when in fact they are divided. The Socialists ('who don't look to me like the same thing as the British Labour people) and the Christian Democrats ("who run the gamut from Strauss to Granelli") have made that kind of arrangement.

Competition within the traditional left, though, is making itself felt, witness the fact that the PCI leader had some things to say about the PSI's approach to the elections. Says Pajetta: "I've seen the slogan: 'If you speak socialist, you'll be understood in Europe.' Well, all I can say to that is this: 'If you vote Communist you're voting to get Italy understood in Europe.'"

But then there is the issue of making the European institutions "count." Sergio Segre, generally recognized as the PCI's "foreign minister," says that the Communist platform calls for specific phases to endow the European Parliament with real power and even to create a European currency.

Moving from general assertions to specific issues, the question is: how do the Communists think they can resolve the conflicts of which they seem, so far at least, to be captives, when, by insisting on aspecific Southern-tilted policy, they have given the impression of penalizing the more advanced regions. In short, will Europe help to restore some balance between the strong and the weak areas? And are the Communists ready to help achieve that goal?

The range of replies was many-faceted, partly because the chairman's table was clearly suspicious that the whole rebalancing operation would wind up in the Stelvio tunnel, as a took for curing the gap between North and South, and the Stelvio tunnel automatically reminds the Communist leaders of Strauss, Bavaria, and the Christian Democrats in general.

Surprisingly, European MP Renato Sandri said: "The gap between North and South will not be closed in Brussels: it is a national problem, a matter of a pattern for development." In more measured terms, labor union spokesman Bonaccini summed up the imbalances between rich and poor regions in these words: "The real problem facing Europe is that of jobs. We Communists stand on 'planning for employment,' not on direct agreement between the regions. We shall say so next week at a conference in Munich."

Speaking of the issues that the people feel at first-hand, Ligurian Regional President Carossino stated: "The Po valley has problems peculiar to it, which do not conflict with those of the Mezzogiorno. We need to revitalize the seaports in the Veneto

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and in Liguria as communications lanes to tie Europe to the Middle East and Africa; we shall achieve that goal with an integrated transportation system."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ABUSES OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMPUTER FILES EXAMINED

Hamburg STERN in German 26 Apr 79 pp 212-215

[Article by Peter Koch and Michael Seufert: "Snooper State: The Bodies in Herold's Basement"]

[Text] STERN reveals that the Federal Criminal Police Bureau in Wiesbaden maintains 31 secret computer files. Millions of Federal citizens are contained there for life.

Alarmed by the STERN series "Freedom 78," which revealed dubious practices by FRG secret services, the new federal interior minister, Gerhart Baum, decreed in summer 1978 that he wanted to be precisely informed about the number, extent and usefulness of data collections in the computers of the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA), the Federal Border Police (BGS) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).

He also wanted to know to what extent the computer systems of these security agencies are interconnected, and to what degree they perform unsupervisable office assistance for each other. Now the first preliminary reports are available in the ministry. They are alarming. Millions of harmless citizens are stored for a nearly unlimited period on magnetic tape with their most personal data--available at any time for police and secret services, public prosecutors and the chief Federal prosecutor.

The unlimited office assistance given every day, which contrary to the law is not limited to individual cases, as well as the generous exchange of data, long ago suspended the separation of the police (with their right of capture, house search and seizure) and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (which deploys V-men, listens in on telephones, gathers information, but has no police intervention powers), a separation prescribed by the constitution.

The comment of a high ministry official: "This is fatally reminiscent of Hitler's Gestapo."

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A further important insight: the data assembled on the basis of "resistance to terrorism" are so extensive that the investigators can no longer see the forest for the trees. Quote from an investigative study by the Federal Interior Ministry: the officials, "after consulting the computer often only have the choice of pursuing all the leads proffered and thus not getting to their real work of investigating information because of the unproductive nature of many leads, or of taking the risk on themselves of ignoring possibly decisive leads."

The president of the BKA, Horst Herold ("Mister Computer"), has pushed the inclusion of citizens farthest. In his Wiesbaden office the Bonn inspectors found 31 files, some of them gigantic. They range from the collection of fingerprints (2.1 million Federal citizens) to "the index of holders of certificates of inoffensiveness for certain games." The craziest examples of Herold's passion for collecting:

--Fingerprints and photographs of citizens who have been investigated by a detective agency are not even destroyed automatically by the BKA when it has been proved that they are innocent. The Bonn investigative report states: "The BKA basically only exempts people in cases where the person involved makes a justified application, or when the responsible police department requests it."

--In the fingerprint collection there has existed for over 20 years a special index for Hungarian refugees who came to the FRG after the 1956 uprising, and for GDR refugees who came to the FRG in the 50's via the entrance camp of Berlin-Marienfelde. This collection includes the fingerprints of the present Federal foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who left Halle in 1952.

--Fingerprints and photographs are still being taken from emigrants from East bloc countries (for whose emigration the Federal government is fighting) when they pass through the emergency admission procedures in the Geissen camp.

--In the special computer program PIZ (Person Identification Central for those who commit terrorist crimes of violence), new terrorist suspects are constantly being stored. At the moment there are 3,500. As yet no one has been erased. From the investigative report: "It includes people, for example, who were suspected of terrorism in 1970 but about whom no facts confirming this suspicion have been found.... In addition, the extent of the circle of persons included allows doubts to arise as to whether inclusion and continued listing in PIZ is really justified because of a suspicion based on genuine criteria in the case of every individual." For these 3,500 people there is listed among other things motor vehicle data, telephone contacts and "political activities and personal environment."

--In the arrest file (13,000 entries) mentally ill people who have been admitted to hospitals are also registered.

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--Information from the "penal data file" is given to the BKA in response to official requests even when for example a probationary punishment has been expunged from the Federal central register for a long time.

--The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has full access to the personal investigative computer system "Inpol" of the BKA. Baum's investigators see the separation between police and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution required by the constitution as being riddled with holes at this point in particular. The criticism is also being made that public prosecutors' offices can draw data from these computers that is not meant for the judiciary, as for example if health departments ask the police to provide the residences of sick people. People in the Office for the Protection of the Constitution can completely tap the terrorism computer PIOS (Persons, Institutions, Objects, Concerns) of the BKA just as they can with Inpol. Here are stored at present 135,000 names--those suspected of terrorism, acquaintances of terrorism suspects, accidental contact persons of such suspects, such as uninvolved fellow passengers in train compartments (at present exactly 6,047), visitors and correspondents of prisoners. But 800 opponents of atomic power are also contained in PIOS, including 232 Grohnde demonstrators of August 1977 and 175 participants in the protest action against the "fast breeder" in Kalkar of September 1977. "Violent agitators" also end up in PIOS.

It is BKA chief Herold's goal to send to the security agencies of Federal Laender so-called recognition dossiers with information and photographs of all 135,000 PIOS individuals.

Baum's investigators commented: "There are facts contained in PIOS for which the right to access of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution cannot be recognized under any circumstances."

The biggest bellyfull in Herold's data system is the little-known computer ZPI (Central Index of Persons), with 2 million Federal citizens stored there at present. Anyone can get into this data bank. It is enough for a border policeman to have suspicions of a traveler and commit his suspicions to paper. This is taken over unchecked. In the ZPI are registered even those individuals about whom a policy agency wanted to obtain information from BKA and received the answer "We have none."

Not only the criminal police bureaus of the Laender, but also the Federal Border Police, the Customs Criminal Institute and the normal police offices in Baden-Wurttemberg, Bremen, and the Saarland have the right to make requests, because they have no computers in their own Laender. The chief Federal prosecutor, in the meantime, has been cut off from ZPI. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution Cologne also wanted direct access to this system, but their request was refused by the federal interior minister in January 1979.

How long the BKA preserves its data is shown by the so-called "central file." Some 2.3 million persons are stored in it. They are not erased

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until 3 years after the person's death, 25 years after addition of the last police information about them, or at the end of their 90th year.

In the "commune file" the BKA has gathered 1,000 living communities with 4,000 persons from all over the FRG. The result of the investigation: "Regulations could not be determined either for requirements for listing or for methods of entering. Its usefulness is not apparent, quite apart from the legal basis." The "commune file" is one of BKA chief Herold's pet ideas. He proudly shows his visitors a map of the FRG covered with dots. Each dot is a commune. Herold says, "That is the ideal hideaway for terrorists." So far no one has been caught in this way.

Whoever writes to a prisoner suspected of terrorism or fills out a visitors' certificate (even as a lawyer) ends up in the "Central Handwriting Collection" of the BKA. Two thousand people in this area are registered. The handwriting identification service prepares microfilms from these writing samples. Then the great mailing action begins: the microfilms go to all police bureaus in the Laender and also abroad--to France, Austria, Switzerland and Denmark. The Bonn investigators commented: "There is no doubt that this collection also includes information about nonsuspicious people." The export to other countries is legally "at least dubious."

One of the worst offenses against the constitutional state is the "organization file." Here 3,100 organizations are registered which the BKA ranks on its own authority as leftist or rightist extremist organizations, but which are not banned by any court. For example, this includes the "Initiative Circle Against Occupational Bans," the "Human Rights Party," the "Committee of Soldiers and Reservists," and the action groups opposed to abortion paragraph 218. The BKA, on their own initiative, fed the NADIS computer of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne with data on 3,000 persons from these groups. This has brought about a complete union of data. Up until the end of January 1979, this "organization file" even retained those who wanted to set up a political information booth. That has now been stopped.

But as always opponents to atomic energy are being spied on. The BKS is still storing the license numbers and owners of cars that are sighted around the planned atomic waste depot at Gorleben.

This computer thicket is too much for the Federal deputy for data protection, Hans-Peter Bull. During a visit to the Federal Intelligence Service in Pullach, near Munich, he failed to get to the bottom of an obviously illegal practice. Bull knew from internal service directives for the Federal Border Police that the border officers photographed the passes of travelers to the East and sent them to Pullach on the orders of the BND. BND chief Klaus Kinkel expressed surprise after Bull's visit: "Why, the man is quite harmless."

Bull's most stringent suggestion to date for better data protection turned out accordingly. In a letter to the Federal Interior Ministry he demanded

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that the data equipment of the border police management at Koblenz, where patrols with military police weapons are on guard around the clock, should be made more secure "by the construction of steel windows with bullet-proof glass or by a burglar alarm system."

But Bull is not finding out what things look like inside.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES SEEN RUNNING ALREADY

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Apr 79 pp 40-41

[Article by Arthur Conte]

[Text] When we observe all the tumult in the world, we have to admit to ourselves that, after all, in spite of its weaknesses and contradictions, our French democracy has a lot of good things going for it.

When we see madness, horror or cruelty taking over entire populations in all sorts of ways, arbitrary behavior extending its domain with its accompaniment of holocausts, psychiatrists ready to do one's bidding, executioners for summary executions and bloody blackmail, we also have to admit that it is twice as precious for a country that has not yet been exposed to such horrors to have a cool-headed captain at the helm. At such a time, the election of a president assumes much greater importance than ever before. Therefore, our reader will not be surprised if, right now, we attempt to see how this essential debate, which comes at a crucial point in our destiny, can develop.

Two certainties and two probabilities dominate the whole picture. The first certainty is that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is somehow obliged to run. We are quite aware that he could hesitate, given the fact that before him no president has managed to successfully finish a second 7-year term. General de Gaulle himself did not do so. The temptation could also be just as great for the president to hold himself in reserve for the republic, available for whatever great providential return to power. In the end, the circumstances will leave the president little choice. If he is not a candidate, there could be so much noise over the fact in the liberal camp that it would be the same as exposing the nation to too many risks. We, therefore, feel certain that Valery Giscard d'Estaing, strong to boot from his long experience, will finally be willing to run for a second term.

The second certainty is that Georges Marchais will be the Communist Party candidate. He will be so in his capacity of secretary general, exactly as he is at the top of the Communist ticket for the European elections. The party secretary general cannot cede the privilege of summit fighting to

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any of his comrades, not even Georges Seguy. If by chance Georges Marchais were not to run for the presidency, it would be because he was no longer secretary general, due to illness or for other reasons, which is clearly not the case. In the event of Marchais' incapacitation, the new secretary general would be the standard-bearer of the Communist flag. In 1969 Jacques Duclos himself, opposing Pompidou, Poher, Deferre and Rocard, was only chosen because the official secretary general, Waldeck-Rochet, was ill and Georges Marchais did not yet have full support.

The two probabilities are also just as clearcut.

On the one hand, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will go on presenting himself as a great rallier. It would be an enormous surprise to see him give up such a role. Moreover, he is not only drawn to it by nature or political savvy. He is pledged to it because of the job itself. He has not forgotten that General de Gaulle excelled at it for many years and failed only in 1970 when he lost his appeal as a rallier. Nor has he forgotten that Georges Pompidou dreamt of forming a huge government party, a sort of big, up-to-date radical party, through a left center rally, one destined to assume the responsibilities of government about the president. Pompidou even succeeded in garnering a certain number of Socialists as well as quite a few very committed "Europeans," such as Jacques Duhamel. Let us rest assured that the current president wants to and will be capable of avoiding any reactions and any movements that could suddenly label him as a partisan leader. He will leave to no one else the role of top rallier of national forces.

Will the Communist Party Vote for Mitterand?

On the other hand, it is just as clear that the Communist Party's chief aim will be to stop the Socialist candidate. This will be all the more easy if Georges Marchais has a free hand. The next district elections are to be held in 1982 and the municipal elections in 1983, the same as for the parliamentary elections. This means that the Communists risk no reprisals. They are in complete control of their tactics. Not only must we expect the Communists not to vote for the Socialist candidate on the second ballot; Between now and then, we must also expect a formidable intensification in their battle against the Socialists. They will long before have prepared any necessary illumination for the day of the big decision, which will consist of solemnly refusing the "social traitor" any support. But who knows? It is not out of the question to suppose that they could go so far as to nourish the hope of seeing the Socialist Party destroy itself in the next 2 years, which would then enable the Communist candidate to be Giscard d'Estaing's chief challenger on the second ballot.

As for everything else, it is obviously less clear at the moment. We can, however, make at least six important observations.

The first is that the 1981 election should serve to confirm the most surprising fact of all since the war: the elimination of the extreme right. The first three republics had to deal with an ever more fragmented, but

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dynamic, powerful and effective extreme right. During the era between the two World Wars, the extraordinary talents of speakers, writers, journalists and debaters still found fame in France. But already during the Fourth Republic, the extreme right was practically nonexistent. Nor during the Fifth Republic has it had any more luck in rising from the ashes. Of course, a certain revival of some extreme right ideas can be observed: a renewal of racism, a new upsurge of antisemitism or "anti-dagoism," an ever greater nostalgia for authoritarianism and moral order. This rebirth has not had a concrete effect on either recruitment or votes. Even men like Jean Louis Tixier-Vignancour and Jean Marie Le Pen -- and with them all the more so, since fierce rivalries pit these chief consuls against one another -- are now more walk-ons than actors. In any event, it is only after 1981 that we can in all probability expect a renaissance of a powerful authoritarian movement.

The second observation concerns Gaullism. The fact is, it has suddenly and very strangely abdicated its vocation of rallying the nation. Whatever one may think of Jacques Chirac as a person, good or bad, the chief political fact, as far as he is concerned, is clear: He has ceased to be a rallier. He sometimes even ventures to play the role of divider, or pass himself off as such. He cannot even manage to keep the main forces in his own party solidly together. This is very worrisome, but it is indisputably so. Why and how did he come to this point? When he noisily broke with Giscard d'Estaing in 1976, was he convinced that the president did not have the necessary grit to accomplish his mission? Did he too lightly take the president for just a figurehead? Is it too hard for him to admit he was wrong in his judgment? Did he let himself be too easily convinced that Giscard would fall long before the end of his term in 1981 and that, assuming he was not too compromised by his connection with the Giscard Regime and the subsequent disaster, he, Jacques Chirac alone, could pick up the torch, a little like Georges Pompidou after General de Gaulle's fall? Was he as seriously mistaken about the solidity of our institutions as he was about Giscard's character? Was he not overly sheltered by the advice of an entourage especially given to political tactics of rupture and the most dramatic of gambles? Or is he right in feeling that only the most rigorous and fiercest intransigence can afford him the best chance of tomorrow playing the role of savior? Be that as it may, today the result is that Jacques Chirac has dramatically isolated himself. Even though followed en masse by those cohorts whose faith he excels at exalting, he remains politically very much alone. Inevitably, it will be very hard for him to escape from this solitude. Worse yet and just as inevitable, locked in his fortress like that, it will be harder and harder for him to hold on to his own troops. In a manner of speaking and despite certain appearances, this roving tank commander runs the fatal risk of trapping himself in a Maginot Line strategy.

For him, this is obviously a considerable handicap. He would need a good kick in the pants and all kinds of favorable circumstances to manage to get back in the running.



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The third observation concerns a situation in which Giscard d'Estaing could not be a candidate due to some serious obstacle. Up until the past few months, we might have imagined that, whether we like it or not, the majority would in the end rally about Jacques Chirac, because he is the most dynamic and spectacular of the candidates. Clearly, this is now less certain. In any event, in such a case, Jacques Chirac could not avoid the test of a "primary" election. It is more than clear that a "liberal and humanist France" now has two first-class candidates: Simone Veil and Raymond Barre.

As for Simone Veil, through the European election she will have acquired the most prestigious sort of authority. This is inevitable, especially if she does brilliantly. As for Raymond Barre, despite a few flaws in his delivery (to which, moreover, he has realistically reacted for several weeks now), he has obviously become not only a national figure, but, even more to the point, an international authority, which even earns him considerable respect beyond our borders. Gaullist leaders would commit a grave error of interpretation in imagining that, in the absence of Giscard d'Estaing, the road to power would be wide open. The Giscard movement has not only Giscard at its disposal. And this fact should be well noted.

The fourth observation is centered on the Socialist dilemma. It is not an easy matter for the Socialists to decide whether or not to have Francois Mitterand run in 1981. Yet this is the big question for them. The arguments that can be raised for giving him the best chance to win are numerous: He is the one who can most readily rally all Socialists. His talent is undisputed. It would be very hard for his party to display its ingratitude. If the oriflamme of the Left Union is to be carried again, they could hardly find a more symbolic standard-bearer. The arguments against his running are also considerable in number: He seems to be jinxed historically and loses all the big battles. He is beginning to suffer from the implacable handicap of age, despite the fact that his friends do not fail to note that Konrad Adenauer launched his greatest career at age 70. He is less capable of arousing enthusiasm than when he was younger. If for tactical reasons he has to form an alliance with the CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education] to better keep his party together, he will automatically lose loads of extremely precious right-wing votes. And lastly, in Metz he did not display the same charisma as before.

Furthermore, the chief weakness of the left is that it bores people. It repeats ad nauseam outdated watchwords. It too obviously suffers from a lack of imagination. It is too true that it gives the impression of being old-fashioned. It has become extraordinarily monotonous. For those who can remember the sparkling performances of a Leon Blum or evoke the hymns of Jaures, it has become oddly dry and drab. Now despite all of his qualities, no doubt abused and damaged by 40 years of intense political activity, Mitterand has not succeeded in endowing himself with the full brilliance of historic greatness. We must also add that Communist strategists have at least gained one point against the Socialist leader: They have deprived him of any credibility. They have managed to persuade the entire country that they would never permit Mitterand to rule. As a result, Mitterand

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is operating and maneuvering in an immense void. All in all, we can understand why the Socialists are pitifully hesitant. Perhaps we should even not so much ask ourselves whether Mitterand will decline to run, but rather when and under what circumstances he will advise that someone else be chosen...

This brings us to the fifth observation, which concerns Michel Rocard and Pierre Mauroy's chances, since both of them are very serious possible candidates.

Rocard: To Be Very Closely Followed

Those who know him well probably feel that he is rather what the English call "second best" (which, to their way of thinking, implies that he could be "first worst"), some sort of dream replacement, an incomparable minister of interior or public works, little destined for the major role, but this robust and outspoken native of Lille could gain many advantages from his very well-known role of synthesizer, advocate of detente and calming influence. Despite a few tactical shortcomings, which have temporarily put him on the bench, he could one day offer a solution.

Michel Rocard is not a simple man. He too is no longer young. He almost got himself indicted for parricide. He has just managed to get more enemies than are good for him to mobilize themselves against him, but he is very familiar with the workings of our major economic systems, he naturally speaks the language of the new elite, he has the advantage of an undeniable human appeal, he is anything but a fanatic and he has a feeling for general ideas and great strategies. Either of them could obviously make a highly suitable candidate. In the gamble to stop the liberal candidate without the support of Communist votes, either of them could even come up with a surprise. For, liberated from their Communist guardians, they could more freely campaign for center votes, especially if they should beforehand be successful in rallying about themselves the big union, professional and sociocultural forces. Particularly Michel Rocard could have a much bigger effect on the vote than Giscard strategists today seem to think. This is something worth following very closely.

The sixth and last observation concerns Lionel Jospin. He is Mitterand's designated heir, designated by the king. As a result, here he is in turn determinedly entering the big lists. The king is playing both sides of the fence. He can bet everything on Jospin with the conviction that he is better than Rocard for the party and the left but, in the event the race between Jospin and Rocard should be too close, he will have kept himself in reserve for the possibility of introducing himself in the final phase as a great arbitrator, that is, as the only possible candidate. It is neatly calculated. It remains to be seen whether Jospin is a good bet. They say he has a good mind, is a rigorous analyst and a confirmed partisan of Mitterand. He is clearly motivated by faith and desire. But he does not produce a very good image on television: a face too gloomy and wrinkled under a thick mop

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of overly curly hair. He looks wrinkled. It is hard to picture him as a preacher of crusades. His comrade technicians ought to build him an airier, less reserved image. Moreover, 2 years is a very short time to create an actor of national stature, even with audiovisual techniques. In doing too much for Jospin, Mitterand in the end runs the risk -- and certainly without wanting to -- of indirectly doing even more for "little Rocard."

This is the general analysis which, given the current balance of forces and future prospects, appears to be both the clearest and the most objective. Barring a major event -- such as Jacques Chirac's suddenly changing his strategy -- it would be most surprising for this analysis to have to be changed much during the 24 months that separate us from the big confrontation which is still the summit of political life in France.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SEQUEL TO MONTALDO REVELATIONS REGARDING BCEN DESCRIBED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 30 Apr 79 pp 19-20

[Article by Claude Jacquemart]

[Text] Bailiff affidavits at the Soviet Embassy: those submitted by Jean Montaldo regarding the source of his files. The proof of Communist Party relations with Moscow.

A two-page typed letter was recently delivered to Mr Stepan Chervonenko, the Soviet ambassador in Paris. The letter was signed by Mr Jean Montaldo, a journalist and writer and author of the book "The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France," published by Albin Michel Publications in February.

This letter contains an offer: to return to the ambassador the documents that enabled Mr Montaldo to write his book. In return: a visa to visit the USSR. "I hope to present my book to the USSR Writers Union in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement guaranteeing the free exchange of people and ideas," writes Mr Montaldo, who had already voiced this proposal during an interview on Europe 1.

Mr Montaldo is joking. He knows very well that the visa will not be granted. But for him, this letter is an opportunity to restate the circumstances under which he collected the documentation for his book.

The book studies in detail the way the Commercial Bank for North Europe (BCEN), also referred to as EUROBANK, which belongs to the Soviet Government, administers the accounts of the Communist Party, its press and many "conveyor belts," among them the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], by granting them "facilities" in which Mr Montaldo sees proof of the financial support extended to the French Communist Party by the Soviet Union (our 5 March issue: "The Multinational Firms of the Kremlin").

In support of the claims made: numbered documents, photocopies of daily accounts and EUROBANK (whose main office is on Boulevard Haussmann in Paris) reports.

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And this is where the controversy begins. BOEN president Mr Guy de Boysson maintains that Mr Montaldo wrote his book on the basis of "fraudulently obtained" documents. In a letter sent on 19 February to Mr Jean Francois Revel, managing editor of L'EXPRESSION, who had published the "advances" for the book, he stated: "Naturally, we are going to sue Mr Montaldo because the tactics he used are condemnable, and he probably will be found guilty."

"Fifty-one days after, I am still waiting for this threat to be carried out," Mr Montaldo replied in his letter to Mr Chervonenko, dated 11 April. And in that letter he gave the reason for his calm: "I found all the original and confidential documents (several hundred kilograms) that constitute the basis for my book in the garbage bags daily deposited by your employees on the sidewalk outside the bank to be picked up by the garbage removal trucks."

Mr Montaldo says he began collecting "in October 1978 at the time of the big garbage collectors strike." He continued to do so until the start of this year at which time his book was finished.

"I have stored a large number of these garbage bags as is: 243 in Paris and a bit more in the provinces and elsewhere," he says. "Enough to fill a good-sized truck."

He ran the risk of not being believed. To verify his claims, he had bailiffs accompany him. Copies of their affidavits were sent to the Soviet ambassador. The official style of these proceedings lends more color to the affair.

The following is an excerpt from one of them signed by Marcel Kharoubi, a bailiff of the General Court of Paris. Called on by Mr Montaldo on 15 December 1978, Mr Kharoubi said:

"At 0515 today, I went to the sidewalk in front of 81 Boulevard Haussmann in Paris where I noted the following:

"Two persons, one white and the other black, came out of the building and deposited about 20 garbage bags, along with ordinary household trash and other waste in cartons or simply as it was, on the curbside for apparent pickup by the garbage collectors.

"Accompanied by the claimant, at 0605 I went up to the afore-mentioned bags. They were not closed, so that hand-written or printed sheets, lists and perforated telex tapes were in plain sight. In addition, they contained miscellaneous waste material, cartons, packing material and glass or plastic bottles.

"At 0610, the claimant loaded six of these bags into his Renault R5 automobile, converted into a station wagon, which was parked some 20 meters from the spot..."

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An inventory of the contents of these bags follows, particularly statements of EUROBANK operations. The lot has been repacked in 30 officially sealed packages.

On 30 January, a new "operation garbage bag" in front of the main office of the bank. Another bailiff, Mr Max de Saint-Denis, related the facts as follows:

"At 0515 today, I went to the Place Saint-Augustin in Paris where I met the claimant. He asked me to accompany him to the buildings located at 79/81 Boulevard Haussmann. (...)

"On the sidewalk, abandoned and piled up were 24 bags of crumpled paper. (...) At 0600, a woman came out of the building at 81 Boulevard Haussmann carrying three bags, which she carelessly tossed on top of the pile.

"The claimant then took possession of seven of the 27 above-described bags from the pile of garbage waiting to be picked up by the garbage collectors. These seven bags, which were loaded into the claimant's car, were carried off for examination..."

Once again, the inventory enabled Mr Montaldo to get his hands on a certain number of BCEN documents. Some refer to Mr Vladislav Sudakov, one of the Soviet directors of EUROBANK. Even backed by the bailiffs' affidavits, these two "garbage bag operations" are not enough to prove that Mr Montaldo got all the documents in this way. They do, however, prove that it was possible for him to gain access to bank papers without resorting, as Mr de Boysson maintains, to "pure and simple theft."

As for the "facilities" extended to Communist organizations by the BCEN, that is, by the Soviet Union, Mr Montaldo sees a confirmation of the fact in the statements of Communist leaders themselves.

On 7 March, Mr Guy de Boysson sent to the managing editor of L'EXPRESS, Mr Jean Francois Revel, a letter which the latter did not publish since he had already devoted a lot of space to an earlier message from the EUROBANK president. A copy of this letter was simultaneously sent to several newspapers. Particularly with regard to the activities of the organization he directs, Mr de Boysson noted:

"Of the several billion francs allotted for loans to clients, according to our monthly statements to the Bank of France, only about 250 million are involved in our internal operations with French clients.

"Of these 250 million, our loans to press, publishing and broadcasting organizations, alluded to by Mr Montaldo, represented between 20 and 24 million during the second half of 1978. These figures correspond to the 19,457,000 of 1 August 1978 cited on page 29 of the book, sums which Mr Montaldo describes as "enormous." Yet they represent only a third of the

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bank aid obtained by these same firms through all of their bankers and communiques to the Risk Association."

Mr Montaldo is of the opinion: "The president of the Soviet bank recognizes the basis in truth for my observation, namely that the BCEN finances PCF [French Communist Party] press, publishing and broadcasting organizations."

On 15 March, during the debate on the creation of an investigating committee to be devoted to public information agency operating conditions, Mr Roland Leroy, managing editor of L'HUMANITE, in addressing the Chamber of Deputies said:

"L'HUMANITE has an account with EUROBANK as it does with many banks. In comparison with operational credit, this account represents very little indeed. It covers purely and simply the payment of subscriptions maintained in a certain number of countries that have chosen this bank to make their payments."

On 25 January 1979, a listing enabled us to note that L'HUMANITE holds not one account, but three with the BCEN, one of which goes under the name of "L'HUMANITE Festival" and another under the name of "L'HUMANITE Festival, Shows." As for the L'HUMANITE account per se, it showed a credit of 4,724,320.12 francs. If this is really for the payment of foreign subscriptions (from Eastern Europe, presumably), it is not an insignificant sum. And is not such a sum more than likely for aid granted by East-bloc countries to the central organ of a "brother party"?

Perhaps the matter would be clearer if there had been some debate. Since the appearance of his book, Mr Montaldo and the book have been the subject of six radio or television broadcasts in the FRG, three in the United States, one in Switzerland, one in Italy and one in Spain. Europe 1 and Radio South have both devoted several minutes of air time to them. On the other hand, the national networks, RTL [Luxembourg Radio Broadcasting and Television System] and RMC [MonteCarlo Radio Broadcasting and Television System], have ignored the author of "Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW INSPECTOR-GENERAL--There will be a new infantry inspector-general: General Jeannou Lacaze will be transferred from his command of the 11th paratroop division at Toulouse and will replace [Inspector] General Henry [fnu]. In 1977 and 1978, General Lacaze, former head of the SDECE, re-organized the 11th division, used during the operations in Chad, Zaire and Lebanon. His new assignment will be to provide the infantry with the required operational flexibility and availability. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 14 May 79 p 17]

MILITARY APPOINTMENT NOTED--An Army general will soon be appointed chief of the president's own general staff after the June departure of the present holder of that post, General Claude Vanbreemsch, who has been appointed head of the First Army. According to an arrangement in effect among the three armed forces, the Elysee alace general staff post in fact goes to the Army and that of chief secretary to the prime minister to the Navy, while that of chief secretary to the minister of defense is an appanage of the Air Force. Thus each of the armed forces can influence one of the three supreme political leaders in matters pertaining to national defense. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 30 Apr 79 p 15] 11466

FOREIGN AFFAIRS RECRUITING--In his Ministry of Foreign Affairs reform program, Jean Francois-Poncet insists on a "new personnel policy." According to the minister, the diplomatic service ought to recruit its staff elsewhere than from the ENA [National School of Administration] and on the basis of other criteria. We must hire Soviet, Arab and China experts. The son of Jean Marie Domenach, a specialist in Chinese affairs, has just entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 30 Apr 79 p 15] 11466

DISSIDENTS JOIN FORCES--Several Communist Party "liberal dissidents" gathered about Jean Ellenstein and Helene Parmelin in the offices of the magazine MAINTENANT to reach agreement on a common front for the party's 23d Congress, to be held from 9 to 13 May. Ellenstein has decided to reply "firmly" to Georges Marchais. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 30 Apr 79 p 15] 11466



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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

NAPOLITANO KICKS OFF COMMUNISTS' ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Apr 79 p 2

[Text] In a speech in Milan's Palalido, Napolitano talked of labor disputes, and said that the goal of the labor movement was to get contract settlements "in short order."

Devoting most of his remarks to workers' problems and to the labor disputes of recent months, Hon. Giorgio Napolitano of the national directorate of the Italian CP, fired the opening guns for the Communists' election campaign in a speech last night in Milan's Palalido.

"There are probably some people," Napolitano began, "who think or who delude themselves into thinking that if the elections were to result in a stronger DC and a weakened PCI, they could hold contract wage settlements at a lower figure and strike a blow at the unions' prestige and at the contractual bargaining power. And then there are those who think that they can run a stronger campaign if they turn it into an anti-union campaign, arguing from allegedly excessive demands on the part of the unions and hence on the charge that the labor movement is behaving irresponsibly." By no means sparing of criticism for Confindustria, Napolitano charged that the "irresponsible" ones are those who "make clever, selfish calculations about the elections and mount campaigns to match."

The aim of the labor movement, said the Communist speaker, a "sound" conclusion of contract negotiations "in short order" which would "attract the broadest consensus and thus guarantee a less strife-ridden climate."

"We Communists," Napolitano went on, "do not speak a different language to our natural rank and file supporters from what we use when we talk with the employers; we say that any assessment of union platforms must start with full recognition of the

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decisive contributions the workers and their unions have made to the economic and financial recovery over the past 2 years."

Reminding his hearers that "wages in Italy are still lower than those in other European countries" and that "a shortened work-week is being talked about all over Europe," Napolitano said that "The condition for getting from the labor movement the indispensable contribution we are being asked for new development is that we move forward along the road of serious and meaningful democratic economic planning." The DC, though, he charged, "has mounted increasing resistance to this move in the closing phase of the national unity policy, until it plunged the majority into crisis."

The DC argues that the PCI's collaboration with government is unthinkable because of the disparity of views on social and economic policy but, according to Napolitano, that disparity lies "in the fact that some Christian Democrats refuse to accept the logic of planning, identifying themselves thereby with the most fossilized of the employers' positions."

Asserting that one of the reasons why the PCI pulled out of the majority was "the contradictions and ambiguities in the 3-year plan," Napolitano concluded with the statement that one of the major issues in the coming election campaign will be that of "the struggle between those who would diminish or deny and those who, on the contrary, would strengthen and fully affirm the rôle of the working class and of its organizations in the transformation and guidance of our society."

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ITALY

COUNTRY SECTION

DC RESOLUTION: 'NO COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH COMMUNISTS'

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 30 Apr 79 p 1, 2

[Article by Gaetano Scardocchia: "How the DC Sees the Situation after 3 June"]

[Text] Rome. Just 5 weeks before the voting, a visit to Christian Democratic headquarters right away enables us to ascertain that one thing is clear and quite palpable: conditions no longer exist for returning to a majority agreement with the PCI and certainly not for a cabinet with the PCI. We know in the light of past experience that long-range forecasts are alien to Italian political habits. We will therefore be content with this diagnosis which applies at least throughout 1979 and which has the merit of being shared by the entire DC. There are those who take note of that with relief and there are those others who instead are disturbed but nobody denies the evidence of the facts. As one of the Doroteo people from Naples put it: "Whatever the opposition turns out to be, our problem will be to find a majority."

The voters nowadays put two questions to the Christian Democrats: are you or are you not credible when you reject collaboration in the administration with the PCI? What will you do after the elections? These are some of the questions which we also addressed to the DC leaders, promising not to mention their names. This time, as happened earlier on Botteghe Oscure Street [PCI headquarters], we started with the conviction that anonymous testimony can furnish opinions that are less influenced by election propaganda. With the PCI--a party that wants to present a united front toward the outside--that was a necessary expedient. With the DC--which does not have such worries--it was nevertheless a good thing anyway.

Compared to 2 months ago, when people were still thinking that the elections could keep all channels open, we now find that a landslide is blocking the way between Gesu Square and Botteghe Oscure Street. Perhaps it can be removed but that will take time. "We replied no and no it will be," said one of our conversation partners. "The DC is like a railcar with a trailer: it cannot take too tight turns." Thus the election campaign inevitably takes on the character of referendum: for or against the communists in the administration. Although the Christian Democrats, as we shall see, reveal

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many facets and also know how to use sophisticated and flexible arguments, there is no doubt that the toughest message, the deadliest weapon will be the one that was brought up already in the past: "The issue is whether Italy should be run by the DC or the PCI." "The communists say: if you want us in the cabinet, you must weaken the DC. We reply: strengthen the DC and the communists will not get into the government."

Is there euphoria or confidence in DC headquarters? No, or at least one cannot see it. It is rather strange to note that the favorable turn of events is not paralleled by the expectation of good results. Let us say that the DC is not afraid of losing votes on the right (although some voters will drift over to the PLI [Italian Liberal Party] especially in the big cities in the north) but it entertains few hopes to get anything out of the troubles of the left.

Here are some quick notes on our interviews: "The truth is that there is no moderate return flow but rather a disengagement or release and that is something else; disengagement leads to mockery, tedium, and irrational voting"; "on the left, hope has died but the disillusioned will vote for Pannella, not for the DC"; "it would take us courage and a spirit of initiative to shake up the electorate but instead, here we are, playing the same old tune"; "I have greater hopes in our electorate than in our party: when I visit a party section, I come back saddened; when I go among the voters, I return feeling confident." But there are those who squash any enthusiasm: "Maybe we are going to get clobbered and we have not the slightest inkling of what is coming; the DC is being run by people who for 30 years have been riding on the same bus."

Averaging all of these predictions out, we can say that the DC does expect a positive result, more from the viewpoint of quality rather than quantity of votes. Compared to 1976, the prospects are considerably brighter: at that time, the PCI was on the rise and it was rallying new social strata and lesser political forces around itself; today it is on the retreat and it has lost some of its attractiveness; the DC for its part was discouraged and isolated in 1976 but today appears invigorated and has gained some of its old alliance. All of this should be expressed in an albeit symbolic shift of the electorate, in a tendency: "A small increase in the DC and a drop in the PCI would be a clear signal: we could say that the Italians feel that we are right and that the communists are wrong."

So far, the theorem expresses the challenge between the two major protagonists. But then comes the problem of how to govern Italy after the elections and at that point we come to the dilemma on the results of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]. The DC has revealed schizophrenic symptoms on Craxi and associates: on the one hand, it accuses him of "timidity" and "ambiguity" in his behavior; on the other hand, it cannot help but wish him success in the elections: "The socialists must emerge well at all costs, at least with all of the votes they had in 1976, otherwise there will be a brawl on Corso Street and we will no longer be able to rely on the PSI."

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To outline the possible moves by the DC after the elections, we must briefly describe its current internal division. We have seen that the entire party is united in rejecting collaboration with the PCI in the government but at least two divergent lines emerge behind this unanimous rejection. For convenience let us refer to them as the line "of the breakup" and the the line "of continuity."

(1) The supporters of the breakup (we might say that they roughly include the Fanfani people, the Mazzotta-Segni group, Donat Cattin, and a few Doroteo men) say that the PCI coalition experiment failed and that one must draw the necessary conclusions from that, in other words, one must right now propose a new majority which will oppose the communists.

(2) The advocates of continuity (with varying degrees of intensity we can include Andreotti, Zaccagnini, Piccoli, the left-wing currents) instead say that national solidarity has yielded some fruits and that it must basically not be rejected although it is for the time being not possible to reconstitute it. Several views coexist within that line: there are those who are really convinced that, without the PCI sharing responsibility, Italy will not really be governable and then there are those on the other hand who are concerned with subtle tactical preoccupations, such as this one: "If we bluntly come out in favor of a return to the center-left, the PSI will get scared and will balk; if on the other hand we propose a blueprint of continuity, the PSI perhaps will stick with us, assuming its own role of restoring the serried ranks of national solidarity."

So, who will run Italy after 3 June? The DC oracles distinguish two phases and on that score they agree perfectly with the communist predictions which we expressed in the first article: a provisional solution until the autumn (the current three-party setup or something similar, perhaps with a different prime minister) and a better-engineered solution after autumn (an agreement with the PSI). Between these two phases there comes an event which is no less important than the elections: the DC Congress. The two lines which we have sketched here constitute the embryo of two congressional lineups which are getting ready once again to bring up for discussion not only the political strategies but also--if not above all--the power positions at the party summit.

The departure of the PCI from the majority and the election clash cut the ground out from under all those groups (from Andreotti to the base current including some men in the secretariat) that had theorized on an agreement with the PCI: "We are in trouble in the party today," a left-wing leader admits, "because there is an instinctive tendency to follow the main body of the voters to the right. Our function is to slow down that push as much as possible."

Listening to certain segments (for example, some of the supporters of the breakup), the October congress will be a last blood-letting, a decisive clash at whose end the victors and the vanquished will emerge clearly. But perhaps it is more likely that something in between will happen ("a by no means

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divaricating success," as the Doroteo people say) so that the breakup will be based on an will merge with continuity; and then national solidarity will become a kind of fabulous Phoenix in expectation of which the DC will be forced to renounce parliamentary collaboration with the PCI.

It therefore seems almost certain that the DC, following immediately after the elections, will once again propose a five-party agreement (but with the PCI out of the government) and that it will seek a more restricted alliance only after the anticipated communist refusal.

The DC leaders say that they expect an opposition from the communists that will not be too hostile and that will enable a cabinet to survive in a climate that is not exacerbated by strong social and political tensions. Up to that point, these expectations can be realistic. But the DC people hope for something more, a certain communist indulgence which would leave enough leeway for the PSI, which in other words would enable the socialists to renew the dialogue with the DC, without being exposed to murderous fire from the left. At this point one must ask oneself: why should the communists be so tolerant?

Let us say right away that we did not find a clear answer to that and perhaps nobody dared offer one. A response however can be detected in things that were not said, in the mood of some of the people we talked to, in the dissimulated logic of certain remarks. When Flaminio Piccoli, chairman of the DC National Council, talked about an election reform of a majority type, some of his party colleagues called his proposals "unrealistic" and "impracticable"; but some of them quietly admitted that something that may be unrealistic today can become practicable tomorrow if Italy's ungovernability should persist with dissolving effects. Hence, and here is the answer--there is a common inclination among the DC and the PCI to ask for a frontal collision: "The PCI is realistic," "The PCI also needs a pause to catch its breath."

It may be that this election campaign will take place in an atmosphere of boredom and indifference. At certain moments in history, similar attitudes can also be the lesser evil. Here is a question asked by one of the DC people: is it preferable to have a certain dose of indifference or a tremendous tumult between opposing groups of militants?

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

FIRST ALL-ELECTRONIC LOCOMOTIVE 'E-633' TESTED

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 9 Apr 79 p 13

[Article by Mario Righetti: "The Heir of the 'Caimano' (Alligator and the 'Tartaruga' (Tortoise) Locomotives Is Totally Electronic")]

[Text] The most recent in the family of Italian electric locomotives, the "E 633," is taking its first steps on the rail lines of Lombardy and Piedmont. This, at least for the time being, is the cold, anonymous label with which it was introduced. Soon, however, it too shall be given a name, chosen according to a referendum by the railway employees as was done some years back for the "E 444" and "E 656" locomotives, which were baptized "Tartaruga" and "Caimano" respectively.

The brand new locomotive (for now there is only 1 prototype) has traveled as far as Milan, and this is only proper because the locomotive is, at least in part, from Milan. The frame, the trucks and the mechanical part in general were constructed in the Piedmont shops of Savigliano. However, the electric section, which might be considered the heart and the brains of the locomotive, was designed and installed by the Tecnomasio Italiano Brown Boveri plant in Vittuone. It is "full-chopper"-equipped, this being the first time this type of equipment has been installed in a production series locomotive.

Furthermore, the "E633" locomotive is completely electronic and incorporates the latest innovations in this field. It is of a modular type, with three choppers, each one feeding a traction motor. The three engines are based on the State Railways Type 750 engine, but with 50 percent greater capacity. The total output is in excess of 5,000 horsepower.

Technicians call the "E 633" a third-generation locomotive. In fact, it differs considerably in concept and in the criteria which led to its genesis and final completion when compared to first-generation locomotives built between 1928 and 1939 and those of the second generation built, generally speaking, between 1945 and 1978. To cite an example that can be easily understood by almost anyone (and a generalized example at that), it can be


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said that the innovations incorporated in this locomotive can be compared to the introduction of a fueling system by direct injection regulated electronically in place of the conventional carburetor. This results in a more regular speed, less fuel consumption and improved exploitation of the engine's strength.

Four more units will be added to this initial one in the next few months. There will be two versions: one for passenger service and one for cargo, with respective maximum speeds of 160 and 140 kilometers per hour.

The "E 633" is part of a total order of 80 units (costing 1 billion 400 million lire each) submitted by the railway system as part of a recently financed plan enacted by Law 503 of August 1978 which allocates 1 trillion 400 billion lire for the construction of a new rolling stock. Another 10 locomotives of the same type shall be built. However, these will feature four trucks and will be earmarked for mountain service which includes steep-incline rail lines.



The new "E 633's" first test run

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